12/23/2009
A Tax on Transactions????
12/22/2009
Unemployment Down, Unemployment Up: Looking Past the News Blurbs
We will not be surprised to see December's BLS info give us 10.2%+ as these people are again counted as unemployed. Of course, one might ask why we don't count the rest of the unemployed who taken together push the real unemployment rate to 17-18%. Wait until January when the holiday hiring effect is gone.
12/16/2009
Talf will end and then?
This means that we can expect some deflation of the bubble in certain securities, but certainly in CMBS. I'm not suggesting trying to set up a short and time it just right. Rather, I am suggesting that with a fall in cheap,tax-payer financed, low risk (yours not mine) buying power, we will see spreads widen, providing some good buying opportunities. Well researched CMBS buys will provide better yields than almost any other fixed income play. The window for this will be relatively small-9 months max, as the world is chasing yield and won't miss this moment.
12/07/2009
Poor U.S.: Unemployment, Net Worth & Buying Power
12/04/2009
The Gathering Geithner Storm
Posted by ccecil
Regrettably for our country, this Administration, which was to be a model of transparency, has betrayed the American people's trust. Too much has been done in the name of expediency and all should have learned by now that the end does not justify the means. At this time it is especially true that it is simply unacceptable that a man with Geithner's conflicts should be allowed to be Treasury Secretary.
Charles Cecil, CEO, Opin Partners LLC
11/30/2009
Geithner: Gotta Go
http://rate.forbes.com/comments/CommentServlet?op=TPage&pageNumber=1&tagName=geithner++opin+partners+charles+cecil
11/27/2009
Dubai Default Coming? Black Swan?
11/25/2009
Three Months Later, Nothing New Here: Excess Capacity in Labor
Despite all the "good news", our labor utilization remains the same as it was in my post three months ago:
September 8, 2009
While the Labor Department’s monthly Employment Situation report is probably one of the most closely followed info points at this point in a recession, there are some aspects of it that receive less attention than they might merit.
In August, the unemployment rate and the change in payroll employment they gave us a mixed picture. The unemployment rate increased from 9.4% to 9.7%. On the other hand, "only" 216,000 net jobs were lost which was the least in any month in a year. One might hope that this indicates a brightening picture with job losses moderating.
However, in the report are several other data points including the average workweek for production and non-supervisory workers, which covers 80 percent of total employment on private non-farm payrolls. The average workweek in August was 33.1 hours, just a bit more than in June when it hit the all time low (since 1964) of 33.0 hours. The problem here is that employers' have considerable capacity to expand without hiring any new employees. Without new hiring, it is unlikely that there will be any increase in the office space needed by employers and will also mean that personal income will only grow minimally, suggesting that retail and vacation spending will remain stagnant, hurting the performance of retail centers, restaurants, hotels, casinos and resort properties.
Charles Cecil
Opin Partners, LLC
www.opinpartners.com
Data Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
CONSUMERS’ NET WORTH, HOUSING, RECESSION & RECOVERY
It is widely accepted that there can be no strong and permanent recovery from the present recession until the housing market is "fixed". The numerous actions by the Federal Government to date to resuscitate the housing market have certainly been helpful, however, it would appear that they will not be sufficient to resuscitate the market to a point where it could be considered healthy.
The Government’s $8000 tax credit for first time home buyers is nice, but looking at the total cash required, the impediments provided by lenders and the magnitude of the decision to buy a home, (let alone a first home), it cannot be credited with too many sales.
The Fed announced yesterday that consumers’ net worth had increased by $2 trillion, a very good piece of news. However, looking a bit deeper, consumers’ net worth is still $11 trillion less than it was before the recession.
Prospective home buyers have lost as much as 40% of their net worth through the stock market and home equity loans are no longer available to home buyers. At the same time, first mortgage lenders have tightened criteria, requiring more income, better credit and more cash reserves by borrowers post-closing.
Why hasn't the Federal Government, through any number of possible mechanisms, provided first time buyers with home equity loans to reduce the cash they would need at closing (politics)? This would greatly increase the number of potential capable buyers for SFH and condos and would help stem the continuing fall in housing prices, currently in a vicious cycle, wiping out individuals’ and lenders’ net worths, reducing consumers' ability to spend and lenders' ability to lend, prolonging any move to a strong recovery.
That flushing sound: Not Just U.S. CMBS
Charles Cecil
Opin Parters, LLC
HOW MUCH FLUFF IS IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS' COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE BALANCE SHEET ASSETS?
Some quick math on CRE loan collateral and prospective future loan losses:
The build-up of non-performing/underperforming CRE loans on the balance sheets under OCC, FDIC & Fed new non-performing loan policy announced last week got me thinking:
Nationally, we have seen an average 250 bpt increase in CAP rates (and some would argue 300 bpt), and a resultant loss in value of CRE as follows:
There are approximately $3.5 trillion of CRE loans outstanding at this time. Assuming an average LTV of .75, the CRE collateral was valued at loan inception at $4.2 trillion. So, assuming an average CAP Rate for CRE of 6, we can derive that the implied NOI at loan underwritings was $252 billion ($252 billion/.06=$4.2 trillion). Increasing the CAP Rate by 250bts to 8.5 results in a reduction of CRE loan collateral such that it is now worth $2.965 trillion, or, $1.235 trillion less than at loan inception underwritings. From this we see that at current values the $3.5 trillion of outstanding lender CRE loans are undercollateralized by about $535 billion. This of course ignores the declines in operating performance that have been experienced during the last 24 months and which continue to deteriorate with each passing month. Taking a stab at quantifying operating performance declines, we could say that broadley, NOI is down 10-30%, depending on asset class. Taking a conservative number of 15% and applying it to the $252 billion of NOI at loan inception underwriting, we find that current NOI may in fact be something like $215 billion. Using our current 8.5 CAP Rate, we get a current value of $2.529 trillion. This suggests that lender CRE loans are undercollaterallized by about $971 billion. Let's call it $1 trillion, and hope that NOI does not deteriorate any further - very wishful thinking.
Charles Cecil
Opin Partners, LLC
11/24/2009
Fantasy Underwriting:
The Riverton Apartments now joins Peter Cooper Suyvesant Town in the ongoing Fantasy Underwriting Contest. Riverton, with 1,230 apartments in Harlem, NY, finally ran through its debt service reserves and its $225 million loan became the largest newly delinquent CMBS loan.
Charles Cecil
Opin Partners, LLC
11/17/2009
Now This is Delay and Pray:
Charles Cecil
Now This is Delay and Pray:
Charles Cecil
CMBS BONDHOLDERS, GET NERVOUS:
CMBS BONDHOLDERS, GET NERVOUS:
November 13, 2009
On Thursday November 12th, a bankruptcy court judgment in the Extended Stay Hotels case in NY signalled a possible change in how borrowers negotiate with first mortgage CMBS bondholders, and CMBS bondholders should worry.
The bankruptcy judge in the case gave the borrower, Extended Stay Hotels (ESH), the right to access a list of names of bondholders of a CMBS trust with $4.1 billion of mortgages on 680 ESH hotels in order to allow the borrower to negotiate a plan of reorganisation that meets the objectives of the various bondholders (read as in “give me my money now”, or, “don’t wipe me out yet”).
This ruling sets a precedent for possible direct involvement of individual bondholders in various tranches in the restructuring process in other situations where the borrower defaults on a mortgage that is part of a CMBS. This would clearly be in direct conflict with the rules stipulated in the CMBS securitisation documents which vest the Special Servicer with bondholder representation. The potential for chaos in a scenario where all the different tranches were individually represented is enormous and would seem to be contrary to the essential structure of the CMBS.
Charles Cecil
Opin Partners, LLC
10/28/2009
The Real Deal
October 13, 2009
As rating agencies have slashed the value of bonds tied to securitized commercial real estate loans nationwide, some loan servicers are taking a harder look at the value of their assets and finding they are worth a lot less. Loan servicers reported more appraisal reductions for New York City properties last month than in the preceding eight months combined, data from mortgage tracking firm Trepp LLC showed. The firms that manage troubled loans in commercial mortgage-backed securities, known as special servicers, reported in September appraisal reductions for 11 properties, reflecting a total reduction of $150 million that month, the firm reported. In the previous eight months, there were only three properties that showed a total reduction in value of $15 million; and there were no appraisal reductions published in the first eight months of 2008, Trepp reported. The largest loan to see its value cut was the Riverton Houses, which was reappraised at $108 million, 68 percent below its original securitized value, The Real Deal reported last month. But that was just one of many, the data showed. The other properties that saw their values fall in September were the Rocket Lofts, at 98-106 South 4th Street in Brooklyn, which declined 35 percent to $25.7 million; and the Core Club retail condominium at 60 East 55th Street, which lost 56 percent, Trepp figures showed. Charles Cecil, partner at Opin Partners, an investment advisory firm, said special servicers are conducting more appraisals as a response to the downgrades of CMBS bonds by rating agencies, in an environment where real estate loan performance is deteriorating and loans will be difficult to refinance. In August, Fitch Ratings downgraded several classes of bonds tied to the Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village loan, which was packaged into a CMBS pool."The downgrades, they put the loan servicers in a peculiar position," Cecil said. The lower ratings force special servicers to ask themselves: "'We've got a bundle of loans in CMBS, and maybe we need to look at what is going on there. Maybe we are getting indicators that the value might not be what it used to be.'"So to protect themselves, the loan servicers have the appraisals done, he said. He expected more in the coming months.
Author: Adam Pincus
Copyright © 2009 – The Real Deal, Inc. , 158 West 29th Street New York, NY 10001 , 212-260-1332
The Real Deal
October 13, 2009
As rating agencies have slashed the value of bonds tied to securitized commercial real estate loans nationwide, some loan servicers are taking a harder look at the value of their assets and finding they are worth a lot less. Loan servicers reported more appraisal reductions for New York City properties last month than in the preceding eight months combined, data from mortgage tracking firm Trepp LLC showed. The firms that manage troubled loans in commercial mortgage-backed securities, known as special servicers, reported in September appraisal reductions for 11 properties, reflecting a total reduction of $150 million that month, the firm reported. In the previous eight months, there were only three properties that showed a total reduction in value of $15 million; and there were no appraisal reductions published in the first eight months of 2008, Trepp reported. The largest loan to see its value cut was the Riverton Houses, which was reappraised at $108 million, 68 percent below its original securitized value, The Real Deal reported last month. But that was just one of many, the data showed. The other properties that saw their values fall in September were the Rocket Lofts, at 98-106 South 4th Street in Brooklyn, which declined 35 percent to $25.7 million; and the Core Club retail condominium at 60 East 55th Street, which lost 56 percent, Trepp figures showed. Charles Cecil, partner at Opin Partners, an investment advisory firm, said special servicers are conducting more appraisals as a response to the downgrades of CMBS bonds by rating agencies, in an environment where real estate loan performance is deteriorating and loans will be difficult to refinance. In August, Fitch Ratings downgraded several classes of bonds tied to the Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village loan, which was packaged into a CMBS pool."The downgrades, they put the loan servicers in a peculiar position," Cecil said. The lower ratings force special servicers to ask themselves: "'We've got a bundle of loans in CMBS, and maybe we need to look at what is going on there. Maybe we are getting indicators that the value might not be what it used to be.'"So to protect themselves, the loan servicers have the appraisals done, he said. He expected more in the coming months.
Author: Adam Pincus
Copyright © 2009 – The Real Deal, Inc. , 158 West 29th Street New York, NY 10001 , 212-260-1332