Showing posts with label financial crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label financial crisis. Show all posts
3/26/2010
The Housing Crisis and Washington's political and ineffective response
Today, one of the Treasury boys actually said that, "... the nature of the housing crisis has changed over the past year...". This shows how completely clueless they are at Treasury and the Fed (or more likely, how politics rules over economic common sense). The housing crisis exists today for the same reason it existed two years ago: the value of housing has fallen such that too many homeowners have lost a substantial portion of their net worth the fall of their homes' values such that they now have no equity or negative equity in their homes. Compounding this loss of net worth is their losses suffered in the securities markets.The negative effect of this situation is compounded by the high real unemployment which approaches 20%. Thus, while we have an over supply of homes, we also have a dramatic undersupply of equity available to buy a home. Compounding this, it is virtually impossible to get a mortgage in excess of $730,000, and many homes in the US are at values in excess of $1 million. Sadly, while Washington has "saved" the banking system, they have not even scratched the surface of the housing crisis, and political posturing which includes statements like another one made today, "...only $50 billion of TARP went to housing...", only serve to scare the heck out of any semi-informed individual. My reference here is to the various Treasury maneuvers that have moved some 90% of US home mortgages to the GSE's who now have an unlimited pen from the Treasury and who have used it to dramatically increase the proportion of sub-prime loans on their books in the past two years. So in fact, Washington's total response to the housing crisis in the past two years has been enormous, but political and ineffective.
Labels:
bernanke,
federal reserve,
financial crisis,
Geithner,
housing,
obama,
recession,
treasury,
unemployment
3/25/2010
Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Banks and Fear
We had predicted that the fear of default by Dubai's various property companies on $26 billion would prove to be unfounded, and now Dubai has shown us to be correct. Dubai new proposal offers what must be viewed as a very lender-friendly deal on the Dubai World and Nakheel debt. Dubai now offers to convert its $10.1 billion debt claims on Dubai World and Nakheel into equity, thus subordinating its claim to other creditors. In addition, Dubai will inject $9.5 billion of fresh capital of which $3.8 billion will come from its own resources and $5.7 billion from a loan from Abu Dhabi. This can only mean that Abu Dhabi approves of and supports this newest proposal. Going even further (in the right direction) Dubai says that if the lenders approve the deal, then holders of Nakheel's Sukuk bonds (2010 & 2011 maturities) will be paid in full and on time. All of this goes to the point that UAE is not interested in having anything derail its plans, not a small part of which have Dubai as the new "Beirut" for European and Gulf residents and an important financial and business center for the region.
Labels:
abu dhabi,
banks,
bonds,
culture,
debt,
Dubai Default? Black Swan?,
financial crisis,
interest rates,
london,
politics,
sheik,
sovereign default,
spreads,
sukuk
2/26/2010
Virtually all players in the CRE industry, securities and banking sectors agree that we need the CMBS market to return to functionality as soon as possible (even the politicians want this).
The CMBS market cannot recover its value to the world until the uncertainties that now exist are cleared up, and litigation between the parties is the most certain way to achieve this. Factors that are pushing for a litigation between Special Servicers and CMBS bond holders of different seniority (tranches) include steadily increasing mortgage loan delinquencies that show no sign of lessening, the huge dollar volume of CMBS loans ($770 billion) , PSA agreements that put Special Servicers in an untenable position with respect to conflicts of interest that they are supposed to ignore (read as in "law suit"), B piece owners who are also Special Servicers who have an obligation to THEIR investors and will be inclined to argue that obligation as superior to that owed other more senior bond holders, Senior bondholders who believe that their position is being injured by delays in foreclosure and sale that may benefit the Special Servicer and/or B bond holders and the always murky question of what liability the Special Servicer may have to mezzanine lenders who argue that the actions of the Special Servicer that benefit the Special Servicer are damaging to the mezzanine lender.
The sooner these issues are cleaned up, the sooner we can see the revival of the CMBS market and the CRE market that relys on it for liquidity, now more than ever.
The CMBS market cannot recover its value to the world until the uncertainties that now exist are cleared up, and litigation between the parties is the most certain way to achieve this. Factors that are pushing for a litigation between Special Servicers and CMBS bond holders of different seniority (tranches) include steadily increasing mortgage loan delinquencies that show no sign of lessening, the huge dollar volume of CMBS loans ($770 billion) , PSA agreements that put Special Servicers in an untenable position with respect to conflicts of interest that they are supposed to ignore (read as in "law suit"), B piece owners who are also Special Servicers who have an obligation to THEIR investors and will be inclined to argue that obligation as superior to that owed other more senior bond holders, Senior bondholders who believe that their position is being injured by delays in foreclosure and sale that may benefit the Special Servicer and/or B bond holders and the always murky question of what liability the Special Servicer may have to mezzanine lenders who argue that the actions of the Special Servicer that benefit the Special Servicer are damaging to the mezzanine lender.
The sooner these issues are cleaned up, the sooner we can see the revival of the CMBS market and the CRE market that relys on it for liquidity, now more than ever.
Labels:
banking,
CMBS,
CRE,
fed,
finance,
financial crisis,
investment,
lender,
news,
recession,
securities,
trading,
treasury
1/27/2010
Remember the Tishman Archstone Deal?
The largest acquisition in the history of the multifamily REIT market was Tishman & Lehman's $22.2 billion acquisition of Archstone’s multifamily portfolio of 359 communities (more than 87,600 units) which was completed in mid 2007. When the CMBS market tanked as they were trying to close the deal, the buyers scrambled to put together financing. The solution came with Fannie purchased a $7.1 billion credit facility, its largest credit facility to date. Freddie bought two pools of loans totaling $1.8 billion, the largest pools it had ever done. The Irvine Co. bought a 90 percent interest in 15 of the communities, which brought in another estimated $1.4 billion, and the company also made an equity investment. Lehman had $2.4 billion of equity in this deal on its books when it collapsed. In 2008 Archstone lenders injected $500 million+ to prevent a default. Given that nationally, rents have fallen 10%+ since the deal closed, vacancy has increased from 5.5% to 8%, and CAP rates have increased 250 bpts+, the Archstone owners' equity is almost certainly gone and the debt is probably underwater.
Labels:
apartment market,
archstone,
CMBS,
Default,
financial crisis,
lehman,
lender,
loan,
multifamily,
tishman
1/23/2010
Outrageous Bonus, Unfair Compensation
Change is definitely in order when it comes to the design of C suite compensation packages. However, rigorous thinking and careful writing is required lest we make this issue as silly as the administration has succeeded in making it sound. The investment of education and time, combination of special talents and dedication that it takes to join the C suite (or in fact get anywhere near it), merit high compensation. So greed may or may not play a factor in a particular case, but in general, the executives that manage and run the major for-profit business organizations, have risen to the top by merit, and thus merit considerable "reward". However, it is reasonable to say that the most senior managers should be held to the same measure as their reports: performance. So, while it may be really upsetting to see this one or that group making enormous amounts of money, it is not necessarily true that it is wrong or unfair. In any case, the root of this problem lies in the reward for short term performance that is integrated into the institutional money managers' compensation/career progress. Having said all of this, the use of taxpayers' funds/National debt to enable financial institutions to reap outsize rewards is not acceptable, and so the lightning that these firms have drawn for large payouts from huge performance, is well deserved. But, let's agree that it is our public servants who made this possible, so we the people should direct our anger and disgust at them.
Labels:
bonus,
fed,
financial crisis,
investment,
treasury
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